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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ARGUMENT

I.

KTM's ARGUMENT IGNORES THE DISTRICT COURT'S DUTY TO
GIVE LEGAL EFFECT TO A JURY'S FACTUAL FINDINGS.
Appellant Kolob Care and Rehabilitation of St. George ("Kolob") has asked this

court to reverse the district court's decision to resubmit the jury's First Special Verdict
Form for further consideration. This is because the district court erred when it determined
~

that it was unable to reconcile any of the perceived inconsistencies in the verdict form.
Specifically, the district erred by concluding that it was inconsistent for the jury to find that
there was both a breach of contract with damages and a mutual mistake between the parties.
In doing so, the district court failed to satisfy its legal duty to reconcile jury verdicts
whenever possible and to "accept any reasonable view of the case that makes the jury's
answers consistent." Ne.ff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, 149 n. 20, 247 P.3d 380 (citation omitted).
This is because the jury's finding that a mutual mistake existed between the parties can
certainly be reconciled with its damage award.

In its response, KTM Health Care, Inc. ("KTM") does not dispute that trial court
judges must in every instance attempt to reconcile any perceived inconsistencies in a
special verdict form. Rather, it argues that there was absolutely no way for the district

6i

court in this case to reconcile the jury's answers. In doing so, KTM attempts to focus this
Court's attention to the jury's supposed intent, as opposed to its actual factual findings.
For example, it contends that Kolob's argument "requires this Court to assume that the jury
8
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had no intention to award actual damages to KTM" and that "the Second Special verdict
Form clearly demonstrates exactly what the jury intended as far as compensating KTM for
Appellants' actions." (Appellee Brief at 31).
KTM's argument regarding the jury's intent is based on a misunderstanding of the
purpose behind special verdict forms, as opposed to general verdict forms. Unlike general
verdict forms, special verdict forms are not intended to allow a jury to simply make a
determination regarding the ultimate outcome of a case. Rather, they allow juries to make
factual findings regarding disputed issues. It is then the trial court's role to give legal effect
to the jury's factual findings. The jury's limited role is reflected in Rule 49, which states
that "[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special

writtenfinding upon each issue offact ...." Utah R.Civ. P. 49(a) (emphasis added). "'The
[trial] court then applies the law to the facts as found and renders the verdict."' Dishinger

v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, ,r 17, 47 P.3d 76 (quoting Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,
470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970) (Ellett, J., further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a))).
The reason for using special verdict forms, as opposed to general verdict forms, was
further explained by Justice Ellett in Brigham:
The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury of attempting to apply the
law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a verdict. Instructions to
the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may, therefore, concentrate upon
the functions which belong to them, viz., to find the facts in the case.

*

*

*

It is the law which gives or withholds an award. The jury finds the facts, and
in the case of a general verdict applies the law as explained by the judge in
order to arrive at a proper verdict. In the case of a special verdict, the jury
9
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only finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the
verdict.

Brigham, 410 P.2d at 397 (Ellett, J., further opinion).
In this case, the jury made several findings of fact in its First Special Verdict Form.
First, it determined that Kolob breached the relevant contract with KTM and that KTM
suffered damages as result of that breach. (R. at 2545). Second, it found that Kolob had
proved its mutual mistake defense under "the heightened standard of clear and convincing
~

evidence." (Id.).

Once the jury made these factual findings, it then became the court's

responsibility to "'appl[y] the law to the facts as found and render[ ] the verdict."'

Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209 at ,r 17. In doing so, the district court should have recognized
that the mutual mistake which the jury found to exist between the parties necessarily
rendered the contract unenforceable. See Red Bridge Capital, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC,
2016 UT App 162, ,r 15, 3 81 P .3 d 1147 ("A mutual mistake of fact can provide the basis
for equitable rescission ... of a contract .... "). In turn, the court should have found as a
matter of law that KTM could not recover any damages for Kol ob' s breach due to the
mutual mistake that existed between the parties.
By sending the jury back to reconsider its verdict, the district court was essentially
asking to jury to make an equitable (as opposed to legal) decision as to whether KTM
should recover damages.

This is because the jury had already found by clear and

.)

convincing evidence that the parties were mutually mistaken about a material fact when
the contract was signed. Instead of giving legal effect to this factual finding, which was
10
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made using a heightened standard of proof, the district court asked the jury to decide
whether KTM should recover damages despite the existence of a mutual mistake. In other
words, it appears as if the district court had concerns over whether the jury understood the
legal ramifications of its factual findings, i.e., whether the jury knew that the existence of
a mutual mistake would preclude KTM from recovering damages.

However, when

completing a special verdict form, a jury need not understand the legal consequences of its
factual findings. Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397 ("In the case of a special verdict, the jury only
finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the verdict."). Therefore,
there was nothing that precluded the district court from determining that the parties'
contract was void due to the existence of a mutual mistake and that KTM was not entitled
to recover damages.
KTM's arguments (and the district court's approach) are similar to those rejected
by the Utah Supreme Court in Brigham, 410 P.2d 393. In that case, a plaintiff who had
been injured by a power company's electrical wire sued for damages. Id. at 396. While
the jury ultimately found the power company to be negligent, it determined that the
defendant was contributorily negligent as well. Id. at 395. Despite this finding (at a time
when a plaintiffs contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery 1), the jury also
awarded damages to the plaintiff. Id. at 398. Nevertheless, judgment was ultimately

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404,408 (Utah 1960) ("[P]laintiff's own
negligence, which proximately contributed to his injuries, bars his recovery from a
defendant who mere ordinary negligence would otherwise have made him liable for
plaintiff's injuries.")
11
1
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entered for the power company based on the jury's factual finding regarding contributory
negligence. Id. at 395.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's verdict despite a dissent from
Chief Justice Crockett in which he which made the very same arguments as KTM in this
case. As the Chief Justice stated:

GI

[T]he effect of this decision is to take away from the plaintiff, a IO-year-old
boy, a special verdict in which the jury found he had suffered damages in the
sum of $736.80 actual expenses (special damages) and $2500 general
damages which I think it fair to assume that they intended and believed he
was to receive.
*
*
*
From the facts that after finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence, and that it proximately caused his injury, the jury proceeded to
determine and award him the damages above mentioned, the logical
conclusion is that the jury was confused by the various special verdicts
submitted.
Brigham, 470 P.2d at 398 (Crocket, C.J., dissenting opinion).

A majority of the Utah Supreme Court rejected the Chief Justice's argument and
decided to give legal effect to the jury's finding of contributory negligence despite the
jury's damage award. In doing so, the Court recognized that it is the court's role to give
legal effect to a jury's factual findings and that a damage award does not negate factual
findings that would otherwise preclude a defendant's liability. As Justice Ellett wrote:
The dissent says, 'The jury proceeded to determine and award him the
damages.' It is the law which gives or withholds an award .... In the case of
a special verdict, the jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law
thereto and renders the verdict. Instead of awarding damages to the plaintiff,
the jury merely determined the amount of damages which he had sustained.
This finding is not inconsistent with the other findings as the amount of
12
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damage which he sustained is not at all affected by any determination of
whose fault was the cause thereof.

*

*

*

While hindsight now reveals that it was not necessary to determine the
amount of damages, there is no inconsistency in knowing the answer. It was
a wise precaution taken by the judge, so that if this court on appeal should
find that there was error and that the verdict should have been in favor of the
plaintiff, it would not be necessary to have another trial. We could simply
order the trial court to render a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
amount of damages found by the jury
Brigham, 410 P.2d at 397 (Ellett, J., further opinion).

As in the Brigham case, the jury's decision to calculate KTM's damages and make
a finding of mutual mistake does not mean its special verdict form was irreconcilable. This
is because a damage award does not come from a jury, but rather from the court based on
the jury's factual findings. In this case, the jury's First Special Verdict Form stated that
Kolob had proven its mutual mistake defense by clear and convincing evidence. Since this
finding necessarily voided the parties' contract, the court should have entered a judgment
in Kolob's favor and should not have resubmitted the verdict to the jury for further
consideration.

II.

COUNSEL'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS A "MISTAKE IN THE
VERDICT FORM" WAS NOT A CONCESSION THAT THE JURY'S
ANSWERS WERE INCONSISTENT.
As part of its argument, KTM makes several references to a statement made by

Kolob's counsel at trial where counsel stated that there was a "mistake in the verdict form."
KTM then uses this statement, without any context, to argue that even Kolob believed that
the jury's findings were inconsistent. However, contrary to KTM's mischaracterization,
13
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Ko lob's counsel was not referring to any mistake made by the jury; nor was he conceding
that the verdict form was inconsistent. Rather, counsel was referring to the fact that the
verdict form did not instruct the jury to stop any further deliberations once a mutual mistake
was found to exist. This is evidenced by Judge Wilcox's statement to the jury, which is
what counsel was referring to when he stated there a "mistake on the verdict form":
THE COURT: But my question to you [the jury] is, on page 3 [of the verdict
form] -- and I'm not asking you to change your -- your -- your mind on this.
If you found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mutual
mistake, then you really shouldn't go further, and you sign the jury verdict
form without damages .... Perhaps on this one we should have said if you find
mutual mistake it said to proceed to Question No. 6. We should have said
stop your deliberations, sign the jury verdict form and return it.

*

*

*

I guess this is something that happens when we do this late at night. We
should have caught that. Mr. Guelker, make a record.

Gi

MR. GUELKER: Sure, Your Honor. I would object to sending the jury back
in the manner in which you did. It's our position that once they found that
there was a mutual mistake, any further findings were irrelevant because
once there's a mutual mistake the contract was unenforceable, and there
should have been no damages. So even despite the mistake on the verdict
form, once they found mutual mistake, that really ended the matter and
everything leading after that is really null and void.
(R. at 3898, p. 327) (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Kolob's counsel never conceded that there
was an inconsistency in the verdict form. To the contrary, counsel immediately objected
to sending the jury back based on counsel's belief that the district court could reconcile the
jury's answers. Therefore, this Court should disregard Kolob' s arguments to the extent
they rely on a mischaracterization of counsel's statements to the district court.
14
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III.

THE CASES CITED BY KOLOB DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECONCILE THE SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM.

In its opening brief, Kolob cited several cases which discussed a trial court's duty
to reconcile verdict forms whenever possible. In response, KTM has selectively chosen
three of these cases and attempted to differentiate them from the facts of this case. These
cases are Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Tooele
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214, 284 P.3d 709; and Heno v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2000).

Contrary to KTM's argument, the foregoing cases strongly support Kolob's
position. All the cases emphasize the need for courts to try and reconcile a jury's factual
findings whenever possible. Based on this precedent, and as discussed more fully below,
the district court should have adopted the jury's first verdict form and entered a judgment
in Kolob's favor.
A.

The Bennion Decision.

KTM relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson
Constr. Co., 3701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) wherein the Court recognized that it is necessary

for counsel to raise any issues of ambiguity in a jury's verdict at trial so that the jury is still
present to resolve such ambiguities. Id. at 1083. KTM relies on this portion of the Supreme
Court's ruling as justification for district court's decision to provide the jury with a second
verdict form in this case.

15
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However, the Bennion decision was also clear that before a court can provide the
jury with a second verdict form, it must first determine whether the ambiguity or
inconsistency raised by counsel even exists.

Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court

emphasized that a finding of ambiguity can only be made after the trial court makes every
possible effort to try and reconcile the jury's factual findings. 701 P .2d at 1083 ("Where
the possibility of inconsistency in jury interrogatories or special verdicts exists, the courts

will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if
possible."). In other words, a trial court is not permitted to resubmit a case to the jury
simply because one of the parties argues that the initial verdict was inconsistent. Rather,
the court must first attempt to reconcile the jury's initial factual findings.
In its brief, KTM simply makes the conclusory argument that "there is no possible
way that damages . . . could be 'awarded' in the instant case if a mutual mistake was also
found." (Appellee Brief at 31 ). However, the jury's verdict did not make an "award" of
damages because it was not a judgment. Rather, the jury's verdict constituted factual
findings from which the district court could then enter a final judgment. See Dishinger,
2001 UT App 209 at 1 17 (In the case of a special verdict, "the jury only finds the facts,
and the court applies the law thereto and renders the verdict."); Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397
("It is the law which gives or withholds an award.").

The factual determinations contained in the jury's verdict are not inconsistent and
can be easily reconciled. As explained more fully in Kolob's opening brief, there was
nothing inconsistent about the jury's initial determination that a breach of contract resulting
16
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in damages occurred and that the parties were mutually mistaken about a material fact at
the time the contract was signed. The burden then fell on the district court to give legal
effect to these factual findings. Since the jury initially found that a mutual mistake did
exist, the Bennion decision required the district court to give effect to the jury's findings
and enter a judgment stating that appellants were not liable for breach of contract due to a
mutual mistake between the parties.

B.

The Tooele Associates Decision.

KTM cites language from Tooele Associates Ltd Partnership v. Tooele City, 2012
UT App 214,284 P.3d 709, where the Court of Appeals stated that in reconciling apparent
inconsistencies on a verdict form, "'the answers to the questions are to be construed in the
context of the surrounding circumstances of the case and in connection with the pleadings,
instructions, and issues submitted."' Id at , 11. Based on this language, KTM goes on to
argue that this Court should recognize the jury's second verdict form because each juror
affirmed the second verdict when polled.
As an initial matter, it is unclear how the language cited from Tooele Associates
relates to the issue of jury polling. In any event, KTM' s argument presupposes that valid
grounds even existed for the court's decision to resubmit the case to the jury. As discussed
both above and in Kolob's opening brief, the jury should never have been allowed to
reconsider its initial verdict. In fact, the jury foreman also signed the first verdict form and
indicated that it constituted the jury's decision. (R. at 2545). Therefore, the only relevant
issue is whether the factual findings contained in the jury's first verdict were so inconsistent
17
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that there was no possible way for the district court to reconcile them. Since such facts
could have been easily reconciled, the district court erred when it provided the jury with a
second verdict form.
C.

The Heno Decision.

KTM relies on Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847 (10th Cir.2000) to
argue that the proper way for courts to resolve inconsistencies in a jury verdict is to send
the matter back to the jury for clarification. Id. at 853. However, KTM's argument once
again ignores the standard for making the initial determination of whether a jury's verdict
is actually inconsistent. The Tenth Circuit's standard for making this determination is
similar to the standard adopted by Utah courts because it requires trial courts to make all
possible efforts to reconcile a verdict before sending it back to jury. See id. at 852 ("When
reviewing claims that a jury verdict is inconsistent, [courts] must accept any reasonable
view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent."). When this standard is applied
to the verdict form in this case, the answers therein can be easily reconciled. Therefore, the
district court erred when it allowed the jury to reconsider its first decision and complete a
second verdict form.
IV.

•

KTM FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE AWARD

In the event this Court does not reverse the district court's decision to provide the
jury with a second verdict form, Kolob has requested a new trial on the issue of
consequential damages. This is because there was insufficient evidence to support the
18
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jury's decision that KTM suffered $120,000 in consequential damages as a result of
Kolob's breach. 2
In response, KTM claims that the damage award should be upheld because Kolob
purportedly failed to properly marshal all the evidence that could support the jury's finding.
KTM then points to two categories of evidence which it believes the jury could have relied
on for its damage calculation. The first are costs related to a pharmacist hired by Adam
Katschke's other pharmacy, Meadow Valley Pharmacy ("Meadow Valley"), in April 2010.
The second category of evidence relates to certain start-up costs that KTM incurred during
the six months prior to signing the relevant contract.
As will be shown below, KTM' s arguments lack merit because they still do not
show that the relevant costs were incurred as direct result of Ko lob's breach of contract, as
is required for such costs to be considered consequential damages. In fact, all the relevant
costs were incurred prior to the contract having been signed. Therefore, since the jury's
consequential damage award is not supported by the evidence, this Court should find that
Kolob is entitled to a new trial on the issue.

It must be noted that Kolob also argued that KTM should not be awarded any
consequential damages whatsoever because the jury's original verdict form stated that
KTM had not suffered any consequential damages. The $120,000 for consequential
damages was only included in the second verdict form. Since there was no ambiguity or
inconsistency regarding the jury's initial finding, the jury should not have been allowed to
re-visit this issue as part of its second jury form. (Appellant's Brief at 36-38). KTM does
not address this argument anywhere in its brief, so Kolob will not re-assert it herein.
However, KTM's failure to address the argument speaks volumes about its validity.
19
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A.

Kolob Did Marshal All the Evidence That Could Support the
Consequential Damage Award.

KTM claims that Kolob is not entitled to a new trial because it purportedly failed to
marshal all of the evidence that could have supported the jury's finding of consequential
damages. However, what is noticeably lacking from KTM's argument is an explanation
of the specific evidence that Kolob supposedly failed to marshal. This is not surprising
because Kolob did marshal all of the relevant evidence. In fact, Kolob marshaled all of the
evidence which KTM relies on in its brief as support for the damage award. Therefore,
this Court should reject KTM's "marshalling" argument.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that " [a] party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). The Utah Supreme Court recently re-examined this marshaling
requirement in State v. Nielson, 2014 UT 10,

,r,r

33-44, 326 P.3d 645.

The Court

"repudiate[d] the default notion of marshaling" that required appellants to "present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence produced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at

,r,r 38,

41 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court "reaffirm[ed] the traditional principle
of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of persuasion." Id. at 'if 41.
As the Court explained:
[F]rom here on our analysis will be focused on the ultimate question of
whether the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy dose
of deference owed to factual findings and jury verdicts - and not on whether
there is a technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default.
20
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Id.

In this case, Ko lob has marshalled all of the evidence that could have theoretically
supported the consequential damage award. This becomes clear when one examines the
evidence which KTM cites in its brief as supporting the award, all of which was marshaled
in Kolob's brief. For example, KTM relies on the $120,000 salary that Trent Decker
received from Meadow Valley, which Kolob's brief discusses in great detail.

See

Appellant's Brief at 14-15, 43-45. KTM also relies on certain start-up costs related to
books, computers, construction, licensing, etc.

There costs were also set forth and

discussed in Kolob's brief. Id. at 15, 41-43. Therefore, it is unclear what evidence KTM
is referring to when it claims that Kolob failed to properly marshal evidence.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject KTM's marshaling argument and
instead focus on the more pertinent question of whether the above evidence, which was
presented by both parties in their briefs, supports the district court's award of consequential
damages. See Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68,

,r 7, 987 P.2d 588 (An appellate court

will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) "if it
concludes that the evidence, when viewed most favorably for the prevailing party, is
insufficient to support the verdict.").

B.

KTM Is Not Entitled to Recover the $120,000 that Meadow Valley Paid
for Trent Decker's Yearly Services.

K1M argues that Kolob is not entitled to a new trial because "the $120,000
presented as a consequential damage award correlates exactly to the number offered by Mr.
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Katschke as the yearly amount paid to hire Mr. Decker - his replacement at Meadow
~

Valley." (Appellee Brief at 36). However, what is noticeably lacking from KTM's
argument is any explanation as to why it believes it can legally recover damages for an
expense incurred by an unrelated third-party. As explained more fully in Kolob's opening
brief, Mr. Decker never worked for and was never paid by KTM. (R. at 3896, p. 277-78).
He was hired by Meadow Valley after Mr. Katschke left Meadow Valley to become KTM's
closed-door pharmacist. (Id., p. 127). Moreover, KTM and Meadow Valley are completely
separate corporate entities that maintain separate books and records. (Id., p. 223-24). As
such, KTM did not suffer any damages whatsoever as a result of Mr. Katschke' s decision
to leave Meadow Valley or Meadow Valley's subsequent decision to hire Mr. Decker.
It appears the only person who may have been harmed by Meadow Valley's decision

to hire Trent Decker was Mr. Katschke. He is the individual who gave up his position at
Meadow Valley to begin working at KTM in order to service Kolob. However, Mr.
Katschke made this decision in April 2010, more than a month before KTM signed its
contract with Kolob. (R. at 3896, p. 136, 204; Tr. Exhibit 84). Therefore, this is a risk he
took in order to improve KTM's chances of gaining Kolob as a client. In any event, Mr.
Katschke is not a party to this litigation and therefore has no standing to seek damages.
Moreover, KTM has not cited any legal authority that allows an entity like KTM to seek
damages for its employees under circumstances similar to those in this case. Therefore,
since KTM did not suffer any damages as a result of Meadow Valley's decision to hire
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Trent Decker, Mr. Decker's salary cannot form the basis for the district court's
consequential damage award.

C.

Kolob's Breach was Not a "But For" Cause of KTM's Start-up Costs

In its brief, K1M acknowledges that it was only entitled to recover consequential
damages that were proximately caused by Kolob's contractual breach. (Appellee Brief at
37). In other words, K1M was only entitled to recover consequential damages ifKolob's
breach "set[ ] in operation the factors that accomplish[ ed] the injury." Mahmood v. Ross,
1999 UT 104, 120, 990 P.2d 933. Despite this clear legal standard, KTM argues that it is
entitled to recover the start-up costs for its closed-door pharmacy because "these costs were
incurred as a direct consequence of the negotiations of the parties." (Appellee Brief at 3637).
K1M' s brief fails to cite a single case in which a party was permitted to recover
consequential damages that stemmed from pre-contract "negotiations of the parties." Nor
has it cited any cases where a party was allowed to recover consequential damages for costs
incurred prior to a contractual breach. This is not surprising, as case law states that
plaintiffs are only allowed to recover consequential damages where the contractual breach
"produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." Mahmood,
1999 UT 104 at 1 22. In this case, there is no question that KTM would have incurred the
relevant start-up costs even if Kol ob had never breached the contract. All the relevant startup costs were incurred prior to the parties' contract being signed. Therefore, even if Kolob
had never signed the contract and walked away at the last minute, K1M still would have
23
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~

incurred the same costs. It still would have constructed a closed-door pharmacy that could
have been used to service other long-term care facilities in the area. Its employees still
would have acquired the skill and training necessary to operate the closed-door pharmacy.
The fact that Kolob breached the contract did nothing to increase the costs KTM incurred

fi
to operate its pharmacy. As such, KTM's start-up costs were not a consequence of
defendants' breach that were recoverable as consequential damages at trial.
I)

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellants respectfully request this Court (i) to reverse the
district court's ruling that the jury's first Special Verdict Form was so inconsistent that it
required the case to be resubmitted to the jury, and (ii) to find that the parties' contract is
void by virtue of the jury's findings regarding mutual mistake. Alternatively, appellants
respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's decision to uphold the damage
award contained in the jury's Second Special Verdict Form. Finally, and in the event this
Court upholds the jury's Second Special Verdict Form, appellants respectfully request this
Court to remand the case for a new trial on the issue of consequential damages.
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
JURISDICTION

A final judgment was issued by the district court on March 25, 2016. (R. at 3966).
On April 8, 2016, appellants moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). (R. at 3971). The district court denied the appellants' motion
on May 31, 2016. (R. at 4091). Cross-Appellant KTM subsequently appealed the final
judgment to the Utah Supreme Court by timely filing a Notice of Cross-Appeal with the
district court on June 28, 2016. (R. at 4094). On July 5, 2016, the Utah Supreme Court
assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at 4106). Therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Bryan

Nichols's expert opinion that it was a "virtual certainty" that the contract between KTM
and Kolob would have automatically renewed for at least six years, where the opinion was
based entirely on speculative assumptions that had no basis in fact. This Court "review[s]
a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion and
will not reverse that decision unless it exceeds the limits ofreasonability." ConocoPhillips
Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 2017 UT App 68,, 12.
2.

Whether the district court erred when it ruled that the doctrine of election of

remedies precluded KTM from asserting both fraud-based claims and breach of contract
claims against Kolob based on the district court's determination that a party who claims to
25
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have been fraudulently induced into signing a contract must choose either to avoid the
contract and seek fraud-related damages or to affirm the contract and see contract damages.
This issue presents a legal question which this Court reviews under the "correctness"
standard. U.S. General, Inc. v. Jenson, 2005 UT App 497, ,r 11, 128 P.3d 56.
3.

Whether the district court erred when it declined to award prejudgment

interest to KTM based on the district court's determination that KTM's damages could not
(j)

be calculated with mathematical certainty or fixed as a particular time.

A trial court's

decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which this Court
reviews under the "correctness" standard. Smith v. Fair/ax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,r 16,
82 P.3d 1064.
RESPONSE TO KTM'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Scope of Bryan Nichols's Testimony
In its Statement of the Case, KTM claims that its proposed expert, Bryan Nichols,

was expected to testify "as to the industry standard regarding the terms and duration of
closed door pharmacy contracts (including renewal periods) .... " (Cross-Appellant Brief
at 6). This is not accurate. In his expert report, Mr. Nichols stated his expert opinion as
follows:
[B]ased upon my review of the Contract at issue in this matter and my
experience in the industry dealing with such contracts, I believe that it is a
virtual certainty that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of
the Contract, the Contract would have automatically renewed for at least six
years.

4l0
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(R. at 386-87). In other words, while Mr. Nichols may have relied on industry standards
in formulating his expert opinion, his ultimate opinion went to the expected duration of the
contract at issue in this case. He was prepared to testify that the relevant contract was
virtually certain to be renewed for six years.
II.

The District Court's Application of the Economic Loss Doctrine to KTM's
Fraud-Based Claims Was Very Limited.
In its Statement of the Case, KTM broadly contends that the district court dismissed

its fraud-based claims pursuant to both the doctrine of election of remedies and the
economic loss rule. (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 8,, 16.). However, the district court's
application of the economic loss rule to such claims was much more limited than KTM
suggests.
As an initial matter, KTM's contention that all its fraud based claims were dismissed
pursuant to the economic loss rule is not supported by the record. The only portion of the
record cited by KTM is a minute entry from a court hearing on September 5, 2014. (Brief
of Cross-Appellant, Addendum 1). This minute entry does not set forth the substance of
the district court's ruling and does not once mention the economic loss rule. Rather, it
simply states that KTM has made an election of remedies and that the Court did not believe
there were any "Post Contract Torte [sic] Duties, i.e., fiduciary" duties for it to consider.
Id.
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4j

iJ

In a subsequent memorandum in opposition to KTM' s motion for reconsideration,
Kolob did address the extent to which the district court had applied the economic loss
doctrine to KTM's tort claims. As part of that memorandum, Kolob stated as follows:
During the hearing on defendants' election of remedies motion, the Court did
discuss the economic loss rule. However, the Court's application of the rule
was very limited. Specifically, the Court ruled that any post-contract tort
claims based on the alleged breach of that contract were precluded by the
economic loss rule.
(R. at 2341). In other words, it appears the district court determined that Kolob's actual
breach of the contract, i.e., its decision not to use KTM as its closed-door pharmacy, could
not form the basis for a separate fraud claim under the economic loss doctrine.
Finally, the district court did enter a formal order dismissing KTM's fraud-based
claims, in which it stated as follows:

•>

.

1.
Utah law states that when a party claims it has been fraudulently
induced into signing a contract, the defrauded party has two choices. The
party may avoid the contract and seek damages for fraud such as reliance
damages and punitive damages. Alternatively, the party may affirm the
contract and seek contract damages.
2.
Based on the supplemental memorandum submitted by KTM on
August 11, 2014, and the statements made by KTM therein, the Court finds
that KTM has chosen to affirm its contract with Kolob and has elected money
damages as the remedy for Kolob's alleged breach of that contract.
3.
Based on the Court's finding that KTM has chosen to affirm its
contract with KTM, the doctrine of election of remedies and the economic
loss rule preclude KTM from pursuing its tort claims against KTM for fraud
in the inducement, constructive fraud, intentional misrepresentation and
negligent misrepresentation. Therefore, the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and
Twelfth Causes of Action stated in KTM' s Second Amended Complaint are
hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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(R. at 2324). This Order makes it clear that the district court's decision to dismiss KTM's
fraud-based claims was based almost exclusively on the election of remedies doctrine.

III.

Kolob Did Not Concede That KTM Was Entitled to Prejudgment Interest.
In discussing the district court's decision to deny prejudgment interest, KTM claims

that Kolob "had previously admitted that KTM was entitled to statutory prejudgment
interest." (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 10). As support for this contention, KTM cites the
written objection that Kolob made to KTM's proposed judgment. (Id., citing R. at 39303934).
KTM's brief misstates the record. Kolob never admitted that KTM was entitled to
prejudgment interest. Rather, Kolob's objection expressly states that "Kolob requests this
court to deny any prejudgment interest to KTM whatsoever." (R. at 2705). The objection
then goes on to state that "in the event this court believes prejudgment interest is
appropriate, the appropriate rate of interest is '10% per annum,' which is the default rate
of interest" under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). (Id.). In other words, Kolob's reference
to statutory pre-judgment interest was only an alternative argument that it made in the event
the district court thought prejudgment interest was appropriate.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
As discussed more fully in the parties' previous briefs, Kol ob and KTM entered a
contract on May 25, 2010, pursuant to which KTM agreed to provide certain
pharmaceutical products and services to Kolob's residents. (R. at 3896, p. 146; Tr. Exhibit
1). The contract states that "the term of this agreement shall be from June 28, 2010 to June
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Cit

27, 2011." (R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 1). The contract also contained two conflicting
renewal/termination provisions, which stated as follows:
1.
Term of Agreement. The term of this Agreement shall be from June
28, 2010 to June 27, 2011 .... Any renewals of this Agreement shall be made
thirty (30) days prior to the end of this Agreement and evidenced by [the]
Memorandum of Renewal to be attached to this original Agreement.
*
*
*
6.
Term and Termination
a.
Term. The initial term of this Agreement is as shown on the
first page. When the initial term ends, this term shall renew automatically
for successive periods of one year each.
b.
Termination. This agreement may only be terminated as
follows: 1) At the end of the Initial Term or any renewal term, provided,
however, only with a written notice of non-renewal to the other party at least
90 days before the end of the Initial Term or then current renewal term, as
the case may be ....
(Id.).
The relevant contract also had a variable pricing provision that allowed KTM to
review and modify the price that Kolob was to pay for its pharmaceutical drugs on a
quarterly basis. (Id. at Schedule A-1,

,r 7).

This provision allowed KTM to review the

price that it was charging Kolob for prescription drugs and to increase the prices if the
charges fell below certain thresholds, as determined by the drugs' wholesale prices. Id.
KTM had never previously serviced any closed-door pharmacy clients prior to
signing the relevant agreement, which meant that Kol ob was going to be KTM' s first
closed-door pharmacy client.

KTM has never been able to obtain any closed-door

pharmacy clients other than Kol ob. (R. at 3 80-81 ).
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For the reasons discussed previously in the parties' briefs, Kolob decided soon after
the contract was signed not to use KTM as its pharmaceutical provider. This decision was
formalized in an email sent from Kolob's administrator to KTM on July 11, 2010. (Trial
Exhibit 5).
In his deposition, Adam Katschke acknowledged that he received the foregoing
email and that he interpreted the email as a cancellation of the relevant agreement:

Q. [MR. GUELKER] I'm handing you what has been marked as Deposition
Exhibit No. 5, which appears to be an email from Jerry Olson to you, dated
July 11, 2010. Is this an email that you received from Mr. Olson?
A. [MR. KATSCHKE] Yes.
Q.
Okay. And, after reading this email, did you have an understanding
as to whether Kolob was going to follow through with the agreement that it
had previously signed?
A.
Yeah. I could tell they weren't going to.
Q.
I guess my question is, is this the first time, in your mind at least, that
Kol ob' s not going to use us as their pharmacy?
A.
Yes.
(R. at 381 ). KTM also stated in its Second Amended Complaint that it "anticipatorily
repudiated the Contract" after learning of Kolob's decision not to use K1M as its
pharmacy. (R. at 308, ,r 134).
Despite the relevant contract's one year term, and despite Kolob's written
cancellation of the contract two weeks after its commencement date, KTM sought to
recover six years' worth oflost profits for Kolob's breach. As support, KTM produced an
expert report from Bryan Nichols wherein Mr. Nichols opined that "it is a virtual certainty
that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of the Contract, the Contract would
have automatically renewed for at least six years." (R. at 386-87). However, Mr. Nichols's
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report did not provide any explanation or reasoning for his assumption that KTM would
have performed in accordance with contract's terms throughout a six-year term. (Id.). Nor
did he assess KTM' s ability to perform its obligations under the contract. (Id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the district court properly excluded Mr. Nichols's testimony pursuant to Rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This is because Mr. Nichols's opinion was irrelevant
and unreliable. Specifically, the opinion was unreliable because it was based entirely on
assumptions regarding KTM's expected performance that had no basis in fact. Moreover,
the opinion was irrelevant because it directly contradicted the facts of the case. Therefore,

Mr. Nichols's opinion would not have been helpful to the jury.
Second, the district court was required to dismiss KTM's fraud-based claims
pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine. As part of its pleadings, KTM asserted claims
against Kolob for both breaching the relevant contract and for fraudulently inducing KTM
into signing the contract. However, Utah courts have consistently held that a plaintiff who
claims to have been wrongfully induced into signing a contract can either enforce the
contract and receive the benefit of the bargain or rescind the contract and recover his
reliance damages. This because the two theories of recovery are inherently inconsistent and
a plaintiff cannot recover under both. Therefore, once KTM elected to affirm the contract
and seek money damages, the district court was required to dismiss KTM's fraud-based
claims.
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Finally, the district court's decision not to award prejudgment interest was correct.
Prejudgment interest is only appropriate where the valuation of damages was based on
strict standards of valuation, as opposed to the jury's best judgment. In this case, the jury's
award was necessarily based on the jury's best judgment, given the speculative nature of
future lost profits and the fact that KTM was a new business that had never previously
served any long-term care facilities. Therefore, the district court was required to deny
prejudgment interest as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE PROPOSED
EXPERT TESTIMONY OF BRYAN NICHOLS.
KTM has asked this Court to reverse the district court's to exclude the proposed

expert testimony of Bryan Nichols. Mr. Nichols is a purported closed-door pharmacy
expert who was prepared to testify regarding the expected duration of the contract between
KTM and Kolob. Specifically, Mr. Nichols produced an expert report in which he opined
that "it is a virtual certainty that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of the
Contract, the Contract would have automatically renewed for at least six years." (R. at
386-87).
The district court properly excluded Mr. Nichols' s testimony pursuant to Rule 702
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This is because Mr. Nichols's opinion was irrelevant and
unreliable.

Specifically, the opinion was unreliable because it was based entirely on

assumptions regarding KTM's expected performance that had no basis in fact. Moreover,
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the opinion was irrelevant because it directly contradicted the facts of the case. Therefore,
this Court should affirm the district court's ruling.

A.

Standards for the Admissibility of Expert Testimony.

Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows expert testimony to be introduced at
trial if the witness is qualified and has specialized knowledge that "will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702(a). "For
an expert's testimony to be admissible, there must be a 'threshold showing' that the
principles or methods forming the basis of the testimony (1) are 'reliable,' (2) are 'based
upon sufficient facts or data,' and (3) 'have been reliably applied to the facts."' Johnson
v. Montoya, 2013 UT App 199, 'if 8,308 P.3d 566 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702(b)).

In order to ensure that this threshold showing is satisfied, "[t]rial courts perform an
'important gatekeeping function' by screening out unreliable expert testimony and
ensuring that 'only reliable expert testimony will be presented to the jury."' Id. (quoting
Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, 'if

31, 269 P.3d 980). To that end, this Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit expert

<it

testimony "for an abuse of discretion and find[ s] error only if no reasonable person would
take the view the trial court adopted." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, iJ 122,299 P.3d 892.
The touchstone of Rule 702 is the potential helpfulness of the expert testimony, a
condition that goes primarily to relevance. See BioCore Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 183 F.R.D.
695, 699 (D.Kan.1998). Thus, the court must determine whether the proffered expert
opinion would be helpful to the trier of fact. In so doing, the court examines specific
34

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subject areas of proposed expert testimony "to ascertain whether each is sufficiently tied
to the facts of the particular case that they will be helpful to the trier of fact." Id. "Expert
testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo,
non-helpful." 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence & 102, p. 702-18.

If a court determines that proposed expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts
of the case so as to be relevant, it must then determine whether such testimony is reliable.
In making this determination, Utah Courts have stated that "'[t]he rule of evidence relative
to the reliable testimony of an expert does not allow speculation."' State v. Pendergrass,
803 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting district court decision with approval). In
other words, an expert opinion must be excluded as evidence when the opinion is based on
"mere assumptions." Id.; see also McLean v.988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800-01
(6th Cir. 2000) (Expert opinion "must have a basis in established fact and cannot be
premised on mere suppositions."); Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.,

542 F.3d 290, 311 (2nd Cir. 2008) (Proffered expert testimony should be excluded if it is
speculative or conjectural.)
In this case, the district court properly exercised its gatekeeper responsibilities under
Rule 702 by excluding Mr. Nichols's proposed expert opinion. As will be shown more
fully below, Mr. Nichols' s opinion is unreliable because it is based entirely on assumptions
regarding KTM' s expected performance that have no basis in fact. Furthermore, the
opinion is not relevant to this case because it directly contradicts the undisputed facts of
the case.
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B.

Mr. Nichols's Proposed Testimony Was Unreliable Because It Was
Based Entirely on Speculative Assumptions.

The district court properly determined that there were "not sufficient facts in this
case to support the proposed testimony ofKTM's expert, Bryan Nichols, that Kolob would
have renewed its pharmacy provider agreement with KTM for at least six years had Kolob
begun using KTM for its pharmaceutical needs in 2010." (R. at 1034). This is because
Mr. Nichols's opinion was based entirely on speculative assumptions regarding KTM's

ability to perform in accordance with the relevant contract. See Pendergrass, 803 P.2d at
1265 (An expert opinion must be excluded as evidence when the opinion is based on "mere
assumptions."). As such, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the district court's
decision exceeded the limits ofreasonability. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46at1122 (Appellate
court will only reverse trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony "if no reasonable
person would take the view the trial court adopted.").
As discussed more fully above, Mr. Nichols was prepared to testify that Kolob's
agreement with KTM was virtually certain to last for six consecutive yearly terms, thus
justifying KTM's claim for six years' worth of lost profits. However, Mr. Nichols's
opinion assumed that KTM would have been able to fulfill all its obligations under the
contract such that Kolob would not have had a reason to terminate the agreement earlier.
As Mr. Nichols stated in his expert report:
[B]ased on my review of the Contract at issue in this matter and my
experience in the industry in dealing with such contracts, I believe that it is a
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virtual certainty that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of
the Contract, the Contract would have automatically renewed for at least six
years.
(R. at 386-87) (emphasis added).
It must be emphasized that Mr. Nichols's expert report does not provide any

explanation or reasoning for his assumption that KTM would have performed in
accordance with the terms of agreement throughout a six-year term. In other words, Mr.
Nichols did not assess KTM' s ability to perform; nor did he provide an opinion in this
regard. Rather, his assumption regarding KTM's performance lacked any factual basis and
was purely speculative. Since this assumption is critical to his ultimate conclusion

~

regarding the expected duration of the agreement, the opinion itself lacks foundation and
is inherently unreliable.

See McLean, 224 F.3d at 800-01 (Expert opinion "must have a

basis in established fact and cannot be premised on mere suppositions.").
Moreover, there were several factors which undermined Mr. Nichols's assumption
regarding KTM's ability to perform. For example, Mr. Katschke testified in his deposition
that Kolob was KTM's first and only closed-door pharmacy client and that the company
had never actually provided closed-door pharmacy services to any facilities whatsoever.
(R. at 380-801). As such, KTM had no "track record" by which Mr. Nichols could judge
its ability to perform. It is entirely possible that, as a new start-up business, KTM would
have been unable to sufficiently meet the pharmaceutical demands placed on it by a nursing
home the size ofKolob.
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Furthermore, the price that Kolob was to pay for its pharmaceuticals under the
agreement was subject to quarterly review and modification. (Trial Exhibit I, Schedule Al, if7. This provision allowed KTM to review the price that it was charging Kol ob for
prescription drugs and to increase the prices if the charges fell below certain thresholds, as
determined by the drugs' wholesale prices. Id. Therefore, Kolob could have decided to
cancel the contract at any point during Mr. Nichols's proposed six-year term if KTM
determined that it needed to raise the price of its services due to unforeseen costs that were
unacceptable to Kolob.
KTM argues that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ruled on the reliability
of Mr. Nichols' opinion because issues of reliability are properly left to the jury. In doing
so, KTM cites the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. and Med.
Ctr., 2010 UT 59, 242 P.3d 762, where the Court held that trial courts should refrain from
evaluating the "correctness of facts" underlying an expert's opinion when determining the
reliability of expert testimony. Id. at ,r 16. However, the Court's opinion in this regard
still did not condone opinions based on assumptions or speculation. Rather, it still believed
that an expert opinion must have some "foundation in the evidence." Id.
In this case, the district court did not weigh any evidence supporting Mr. Nichols' s
opinion. Rather, it correctly determined that there was no evidence whatsoever to support
the opinion. Specifically, there was no evidence to support Mr. Nichols' assumptions that
KTM would have performed all its obligations under the contract for a full six years. In
38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

fact, Mr. Nichols's report makes no attempt whatsoever to explain why he believes KTM
would be able to fulfill its obligations. Rather, he simply assumed this would be the case.
This Court has previously recognized that where the evidence regarding a "critical factor"
identified by an expert witness is "minimal to non-existent," the expert opinion may be
excluded as being "too speculative." Pendergrass, 803 P.2d at 1266. Therefore, the district
court did not invade the jury's role when it exercised its gatekeeper function and
determined that that Mr. Nichols' expert opinion was based on speculative assumptions.
The fact is that is impossible to know whether KTM would have given Kolob cause
to terminate the agreement if KTM had actually performed the contract. In turn, it was
also impossible for Mr. Nichols to conclude with "virtual certainty" that Kolob would have
renewed its agreement with KTM for six consecutive terms if Kolob had not chosen to
terminate the contract when it did. Any opinions in this regard are purely speculative and
based on assumptions that have no basis in fact. Therefore, since Mr. Nichols's opinion is
premised on pure speculation, the opinion is inherently unreliable and must be excluded by
this Court pursuant to Rule 702.

C.

Mr. Nichols' Testimony Was Irrelevant Because the Contract Was
Terminated and Repudiated During Its Initial One-Year Term.

Even if this Court believes that the district court abused its discretion in determining
that Mr. Nichols's testimony was speculative and based on assumptions, it should still
uphold the district court's decision to exclude the testimony. This is because there was no
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issue of fact as to how long the contract could have theoretically lasted. Rather, the
undisputed facts showed that the contract expired after its initial one-year term because
neither party renewed the contract. Moreover, Kolob affirmatively notified KTM in
writing two weeks after the contract's commencement date that it would not be using
KTM's services. Therefore, Mr. Nichols's opinion was properly excluded because it
directly contradicted the undisputed facts of this case. See Eskelson, 2010 UT 59 at ,r16
("[A]n expert cannot give opinion testimony that 'flies in the face of uncontroverted
physical facts also in evidence .... "') (citation omitted).
There is no dispute that the contract at issue in this case had an initial term of one
year. (Trial Exhibit 1 at ,r1) ("The term of this Agreement shall be from June 28, 2010 to
June 27, 2011."). Furthermore, the Agreement expressly states in its first paragraph that
"[a]ny renewals of this Agreement shall be made thirty (30) days prior to the end of this
Agreement and evidenced by [a] Memorandum of Renewal.. .. " Id. In this case, there is
no evidence that either party took any affirmative action to renew the agreement beyond
its initial one-year term. To the contrary, KTM admits in its Second Amended Complaint
that it "anticipatorily repudiated the Contract" after learning of Kolob's decision not to use
KTM as its pharmacy. (R. at 308, ,r 134). Therefore, since there is no dispute that the
parties chose not to renew the contract beyond its one year term in accordance with the
contract's renewal provision, Mr. Nichols's opinion that the agreement could have been
expected to last for six years is irrelevant and must be excluded. See SCFC /LC, Inc. v.
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Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 968-69 (10th Cir.1994) ("when indisputable record facts

contradict or otherwise render the [expert] opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's
verdict.")
Kolob acknowledges that the foregoing renewal provision directly conflicts with a
boilerplate automatic renewal provision contained at the end of the agreement. ("Trial
Exhibit 1 at ,6). This provision states that the contract's initial one year term "shall renew
automatically for successive periods of one year each" unless one of the parties terminates
the agreement by providing "a written notice of non-renewal to the other party at least 90
days before the end of the Initial Term." Id This provision obviously conflicts with the
renewal provision discussed above, as it requires an affirmative termination as opposed to
an affirmative renewal.
Fortunately, it is not necessary for the Court to reconcile this conflict.

Even if the

court assumes that the agreement requires a party to provide written notice at least 90 days
before the end of the initial term to terminate the contract, the contract still did not extend
beyond one year. This is because Kolob did notify KTM in writing of its desire to terminate
the contract. (R. at 377). The notification was sent via email on July 11, 2010, which was
more than eleven months prior to the end of the contract's one-year term. Id. Moreover,
Mr. Katschke acknowledged that he received this email and that it confirmed for him that
Kolob was not going to follow through with the contract. (R. at 381 ). This means that the
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agreement was never extended or renewed by either party, regardless of which renewal
provision is found to be controlling.
In sum, Rule 702 states that for expert testimony to be admissible, it must "help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 702(a). In this case, Mr. Nichols's
proposed expert testimony regarding the expected length ofKolob's agreement with KTM
would not have helped the trier of fact to understand any evidence in this case. This
because the undisputed facts established that the relevant contract was not extended beyond
its initial one year term, but rather was terminated by Kolob two weeks after its
commencement date. Therefore, Mr. Nichols's opinion is irrelevant to this case and was
properly excluded by the district court.

D.

The District Court Properly Excluded Mr. Nichols's Testimony Prior to
Trial.

Finally, KTM argues that the district court's decision to exclude Mr. Nichols's
testimony prior to trial was improper. This is because KTM believes there was a "[f]actual
dispute between the parties as to the duration of the Contract" that should have prevented
the district court from excluding the testimony. (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 45). However,
the district court's decision to exclude Mr. Nichols's testimony prior to trial was a proper
exercise of its gatekeeper responsibilities.
Contrary to KTM's argument, all the facts and evidence which the district court
relied on for its decision were established and undisputed when the court made its ruling.
Most importantly, there was no dispute that Mr. Nichols's opinion regarding the "virtual
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certainty" of the contract's duration was based on an assumption that KTM would be able
to perform all its obligations under the contract. This is because KTM and Mr. Nichols
were unable to identify any facts which supported Mr. Nichols's assumption. Therefore,
since Mr. Nichols' s opinion was speculative on its face, there were no disputed facts that
precluded the district court's decision.
Similarly, KTM has failed to identify any disputed facts regarding Kolob's
termination of the contract two weeks after its commencement date. This is because all the
relevant facts had previously been established in discovery. For example, there was no
dispute that Kolob sent an email to KTM on July 11, 2010 in which it stated that it was not
going to use KTM as its closed-door pharmacy. (R. at 377). It was also undisputed that
Mr. Katschke received this email and that that it confirmed for him that Kolob was not
going to follow through with the contract. (R. at 381). Finally, it was undisputed that
Kolob had filed a Second Amended Complaint in which it admitted that it repudiated the
contract after receiving the foregoing email from Kolob. (R. at 308,, 134).
Based on these undisputed facts, as well as Mr. Nichols's expert report, the district
court was entitled to exclude Mr. Nichols's opinion prior to trial. All the facts (or the lack
thereof) which the district court relied on for its decision had already been established when
the ruling was made. Therefore, this Court should find that the district court did not act
outside the bounds of reasonableness when it excluded Mr. Nichols's opinion.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED KTM'S FRAUD-BASED
CLAIMS UNDER THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE.

In its Second Amended Complaint, KTM asserted several alternative claims against
Kolob. First, it asserted several contract claims (e.g., breach of contract, breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, anticipatory repudiation) which were based on allegations
that Kolob had breached an enforceable contract between the parties. (R. at 292-344).
Second, it asserted several fraud-based claims (e.g., fraud in the inducement, constructive
~

fraud, intentional misrepresentation) which were based on allegations that Kolob had
intentionally failed to disclose that it would be unable to get out its contract with Superior
Care Pharmacy ("Superior Care") when it signed its contract with KTM. (Id.).
As part of its alternative claims against Kolob, KTM also asserted multiple theories
of recovery. For example, KTM sought to enforce the contract and recover lost profits,
i.e., the profits it would have realized if Kolob had used KTM as its pharmacy. (R. at
1462). At the same time, KTM sought to recover reliance damages for the out-of-pocket
costs it incurred prior to the relevant contract being signed. (Id.).
Prior to trial, the district court entered an order in which determined that a party
claiming to have been fraudulently induced into signing a contract may either affirm the
contract and seek contract damages (e.g., lost profits) or avoid the contract and seek
reliance and punitive damages. (R. at 2325). It further determined that Kolob previously
had chosen to affirm the relevant contract as part of its previous court filings. (Id.).
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Therefore, the court dismissed KTM's fraud-based claims on the grounds that KTM had
elected to seek contract-based remedies at trial. (Id).
KTM now claims that the district court erred when it determined that KTM was
precluded from asserting both its contract and fraud-based claims at trial. 3 Specifically, it
argues that its decision to pursue contract damages for breach of contract should not have
precluded it from pursuing reliance and punitive damages for fraud. However, as will be
shown more fully below, the district court's decision to dismiss KTM's fraud-based claims
was a proper application of the election of remedies doctrine.

A.

Scope of the Election of Remedies Doctrine.

The election of remedies doctrine is a ''technical rule of procedure and its
purpose is ... to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes
a choice between inconsistent remedies, and knowledgeable selection of one
thereof." Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Utah App. 1995). Furthermore,
this doctrine does not conflict with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e), which allows
parties to plead claims in the alternative. This is because the Rule's liberal pleading
standard does not extend into the trial phase. As Utah courts have explained:
Our rules of civil procedure do not limit the number of claims or
defenses a party may plead. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e). The parties' freedom
KTM does not challenge the district court's determination that it had previously chosen
to pursue contract-based damages. Nor does it claim that it would have chosen to pursue
on1y fraud-based claims if given the opportunity. Rather, its argument is that it should have
been allowed to pursue both categories of damages at trial.
3
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at the pleading stage applies regardless of the pleaded claims'
consistency or the fact that some claims are based on legal grounds and
others on equitable grounds. Id. But at later stages of the proceeding,
consistency requirements limit the freedom the parties enjoyed at the
pleading stage.
Northgate Village Development, LC v. Orem City, 2014 UT App 86, iJ 48 (discussing
the extent to which plaintiff could pursue alternative claims for breach of contract
and quantum meruit) (emphasis added).
Utah courts have consistently held that plaintiffs such as KTM, who claim that
they were fraudulently induced into signing a contract, are precluded from
recovering both contract damages and fraud-based damages. Rather, they must
choose which remedies they will pursue. This is because the two types of remedies
are inherently inconsistent. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
It is well settled that one who is induced to make a sale or trade by the
deceit of a vendee has the choice of two remedies upon his discovery
of the fraud; he may affirm the contract and sue for his damages, or he
may rescind it and sue for ... what he has paid out on the contract. The
former remedy counts upon the affirmance or validity of the
transaction; the latter repudiates the transaction and counts upon its
invalidity. The two remedies are inconsistent, and the choice of one
rejects the other, because the sale cannot be valid and void at the same
time.
Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P. 196, 199 (Utah 1927); see also Mecham
v. Benson, 590 P .2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979) ("Traditionally, a person who has been
fraudulently induced to enter into a contract has either of two remedies; he could
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rescind the transaction tendering back what he has received and suing for what he
has parted with; or, he may affirm the transaction and maintain an action in deceit.")
(emphasis added); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc., Inc., 139 P .2d 634, 639 (Utah
App. 1987) ("There is no dispute that '[t]he plaintiff in an action for fraud has the
option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm
the transaction and recover damages."') (quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,
1247 (Utah 1980).
Furthermore, there must be an election of remedies in cases involving
contracts and fraud because the recovery of both lost profits and reliance/punitive
damages constitutes a double recovery. See Palmer, 892 P.2d at 1061-62 (election
of remedies doctrine designed to prevent double recovery for single wrong). As
commentators have stated:
The two remedial approaches, one based on affirmance, the other on
avoidance, are inconsistent in the sense that they point in different
directions. In some cases and with some claims they are inconsistent in
the added sense that the plaintiff who recovered both kinds of remedies
might be getting more remedial desert than he should.
3 Dan B. Dobbs, Law ofRemedies§ 12.7(6), at 186 (2d ed. 1993).
As will be shown more fully below, the doctrine of election of remedies, as
applied by Utah courts, required the district court in this case to preclude KTM from
pursuing both its contract and fraud claims against Kolob at trial.

47

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

KTM Was Precluded from Pursuing Both Its Contract and FraudBased Claims at Trial.

In this case, the district court was correct when it required KTM to elect which
category of remedies to pursue at trial. This is because KTM's claims for both contract
damages and fraud-based damages were inherently inconsistent.
In order to recover contract damages, KTM was required to affirm its contract with
Kolob and ask the jury to enforce it. In contrast, KTM's claims for fraud were based on
allegations that it would have never signed the contract but for Kolob's false statements
regarding its ability to perform. By seeking both remedies, KTM would have been asking
the jury to enforce a contract that it was fraudulently induced into signing (and which was
therefore void).

See West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah

Ct.App.1993) ("[W]hat appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement ... may
be voidable for fraud .... "). A jury obviously cannot be asked to enforce a void contract.
Therefore, KTM' s alternative claims presented precisely the type of inconsistent remedies
that the Utah Supreme Court has stated cannot be pursued simultaneously at trial.
On appeal, KTM claims that its breach of contract claims should not have precluded
it from also recovering fraud-based damages because doing so would not result in a double
recovery. (Cross-Appellant Brief at 49-51). This is not true. For example, ifKTM could
pursue both claims, it could seek a double recovery in the form of lost-profits for breach of
contract and reliance damages for fraud. This is because lost profits are measured by
subtracting an entity's operating costs from its gross revenue. In contrast, reliance damages
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compensate a plaintiff for any costs it incurs as a result of the defendant's fraudulent
statements.

See Cook, 253 P. at 199 (Party fraudulently induced into signing contract

"may rescind it and sue for ... what he has paid out on the contract."). If KTM was
allowed to recover both types of damages, it would be able to recover both the profits it
would have received under the contract as well as the costs it incurred to generate such
profits. In other words, KTM would receive a windfall because it would be placed in a
better position than if the contract had never been signed. It would receive its anticipated
profit under the contract while also being reimbursed for the related costs. See 3 Dan B.
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 12.7(6) at 186 ("some claims ... are inconsistent in the
added sense that the plaintiff who recovered both kinds of remedies might be getting
more remedial desert than he should.").
In sum, Utah courts have consistently held that a plaintiff who claims to have been
wrongfully induced into signing a contract can either enforce the contract and receive the
benefit of the bargain or rescind the contract and recover his reliance damages. The two
theories of recovery are inherently inconsistent and a plaintiff cannot recover under both.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to require KTM to choose
between its contract and fraud-based claims prior to trial.
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Cl)

C.

The District Court's Application of the Economic Loss Doctrine to
KTM's Fraud-Based Claims Was Very Limited.

KTM devotes a great deal of its brief to discussing why its fraud-based claims were
not precluded by the economic loss doctrine. However, the district court's application of
the doctrine to KTM's claims was very narrow in scope.
In response to Kolob's arguments regarding the election ofremedies doctrine, KTM
argued that it should be allowed to pursue its fraud-based claims (in addition to its contract
claims) to the extent the fraud-based claims were based on Kolob's actual breach the
contract.

(R. at 2433) ("Plaintiff does not seek to assert its fraud claims regarding

Defendants' conduct prior to the execution of the contract with KTM."). It believed that
such claims did not require it to repudiate the relevant contract and therefore the claims
could proceed despite the election of remedies doctrine.
In response to this argument, the district court concluded that any fraud claim based
GD

on Kolob's actual breach of the contract would be precluded by the economic loss doctrine.
Under this doctrine, "a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express
or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such breach absent an
independent duty ofcare under tort law." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 202 UT 52, ,r 16, 48 P.3d
235 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case,
the district court concluded that KTM had no legal duty separate and apart from the contract
itself (such as a fiduciary duty) that precluded it from breaching the contract. (Cross-
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Appellant Brief, Addendum 1). Therefore, it ruled that any fraud claims based on Kolob's
actual breach of the contract were barred by the economic loss rule.
In any event, KTM's Second Amended Complaint makes clear that none of its
fraud-based claims were actually based on Kolob's breach of contract. Rather, these claims
were based entirely on Kolob's pre-contract statements regarding its ability to terminate its
pharmaceutical contract with Superior Care. For example, KTM's claim for fraud in the
inducement was based on statements Kolob made "during the negotiation process of the
Contract." (R. at 315, 1191). KTM's claim for constructive fraud was based on allegations
that Kolob "did not disclose to KTM the material fact that Defendants would not terminate
their apparent contract with Superior Care .... " (R. at 316, 1204). Finally, KTM's claim
for intentional misrepresentation alleged that Kolob was aware that it was "obligated under
a previous contract with Superior Care ... at the time [KTM] entered into the Contract."
(R. at 318, 1214). In other words, KTM never alleged that its fraud claims were based on
a post-contract breach prior to receiving Kol ob' s motion regarding the election of remedies.
Based on KTM's brief, it appears that the district court's application of the
economic loss rule may now be moot. This is because KTM is no longer asserting that its
fraud claims are based on Kolob's breach of the contract. Instead, it seems to concede that
such claims are based entirely on pre-contract negotiations. (Cross-Appellant Brief at 52)
("KTM asserted that Appellants acted with fraudulent intent during the course of contract
negotiations and then fraudulently used the new Contract with KTM to renegotiate their
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(il

original agreement with [Superior Care].").

These pre-contract fraud claims were

dismissed pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine, and not the economic loss doctrine.
Nevertheless, to the extent K1M's fraud claims could be interpreted as being based
on the defendants' post-contract breach, the district court's application of the economic
loss rule was correct. This is because Kolob's duty not to breach the contract was based on
the contract's language, and not any independent tort duty. See, Hermansen, 2002 UT 52
at ~16 (The proper focus under the economic loss rule "is on the source of the duties alleged
to have been breached."). Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's ruling
stating that the economic loss rule precluded K1M's fraud claims to the extent they were
based on Kolob's breach of the contract.

III.

~

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION NOT TO AWARD PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST WAS CORRECT.

K1M is asking this court to reverse the district court's decision not to award
prejudgment interest on the damage award it received for Kolob's breach of contract.
However, the district court's decision was correct because there is no indication that the
jury relied on a fixed standard or formula in calculating K1M's damages. Rather, it appears
the jury simply used its best judgment. This is especially true where K1M was a new
business with a no previous history of profits. Therefore, Utah law precluded the district
court from awarding prejudgment interest to KTM.
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest may only be awarded "where the damage is
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be
52
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measured by facts and figures." Bjorkv. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315,317 (Utah), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). "If the jury must determine
the loss by using its best judgment as to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation,
prejudgment interest is inappropriate." Shoreline Devel., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d
207,221 (Utah App. 1992).
Under this rule, "the standard that must be met to obtain prejudgment interest on
lost profit is whether such a claim 'is ascertainable with mathematical accuracy."'

Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah
App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 884 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1994) (quoting Canyon Country

Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989)). As this Court has explained:
[f]or damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be
ascertained in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards
of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather
than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed
for past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured
by any fixed standards of value.

Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P .2d 4 75, 483 (Utah App.1989)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Courts have also noted that "the very nature of
lost future profits injects an air of uncertainty and speculation into the calculation of
damages." Anesthesiologists Associates, 852 P.2d at 1042. This is because ajury is usually
required "to assess expert testimony and apply its best judgment to determine a fair amount
for lost profits." Id.

53

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lost profits are even more difficult to calculate when the plaintiff is not an
established business and has no records of past revenues or expenses. Id. In such instances,
the Utah Supreme Court views "loss-of-profits damage as analogous to damages awarded
in wrongful death or defamation cases and therefore unliquidated." Canyon Country Store,
781 P.2d at 422 (affirming trial court's decision not to award prejudgment interest on lost
profit award to grocery store opened for only 14 months). Without a "long-term history of
profits" there is simply too much "uncertainty involved in determining actual loss." Id. As
such, it is "inappropriate for the trial court to allow for the addition of prejudgment interest"
where a new business has been awarded lost profits.
In this case, the jury necessarily used its best judgment in calculating KTM's
damage award. The damage award was based primarily on KTM's future lost-profits. In
order to calculate lost-profits, the jury necessarily had to use its "best judgment" in
determining the amount of revenue KTM would have received under the contract, as well
as the costs it would have had to incur to perform the contract. See Anesthesiologists

Associates, 852 P .2d at 1042 (recognizing that prejudgment interest is often not applied to
future lost profits because a jury must "assess expert testimony and apply its best judgment
to determine a fair amount for lost damages."). This is because there was no fixed standard
for the jury to use in determining the financial numbers needed to calculate lost profits.
The jury faced even more uncertainty in determining KTM' s lost profits because
KTM was a new business that had never previously served any long-term care facilities
such as Kolob. As such, there were no records of past revenue or expenses that a jury could
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review to determine KTM' s profit margin or whether KTM even had the ability to perform
the contract successfully. Rather, it simply had to use its best judgment in determining
whether KTM would have realized a profit if it had been allowed to perfonn the relevant
contract.
Based on the foregoing, the district court's decision to deny prejudgment interest in
this matter was correct. There was simply no indication that the jury's award was based

on fixed standards of valuation. Rather, the jury necessarily had to use its best judgment,
especially given the uncertain nature of lost-profits and the fact that K1M was a new
business.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's decision regarding

prejudgment interest.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellants respectfully request this Court to affinn the
district court's decisions: (I) to exclude Mr. Nichols's expert opinion from the trial, (2) to
dismiss KTM's fraud-based claims, and (3) not to award prejudgment interest on KTM's
damage award.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2017.

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.

GG ~----~

By:
GARY R. GUELKER

\

Attorneys for KTM and Apex
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